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The article draws on the first findings of the INFOCORE project to better understand the ways in 
which different types of media matter to the emergence, escalation or conversely, the pacification 
and prevention of violence. It makes the case for combining an interactionalist approach of media 
influence, which is centred on the effects of evidential claims, frames and agendas made by various 
actors over time, with greater sensitivity for the factors that make conflict cases so different. We 
argued that the specific role played by the media depends, chiefly, a) on the ways in which it 
transforms conflict actors’ claims, interpretations and prescriptions into media content and b) their  
ability to amplify these contents and endow them with reach, visibility and consonance. We found 
significant variation in media roles across six conflict cases and suggest that they are best explained 
by four interlocking conditioning factors: (i) the degree to which the media landscape is diverse and 
free, or conversely, controlled and instrumentalised by conflict parties; (ii) societal attitudes to and 
uses of different media by audiences; (iii) different degrees of conflict intensity and dynamics 
between the conflict parties; (iv) the degree and nature of the involvement of regional and 
international actors. We argue that de-escalatory media influence will be most effective over the 
longer term, in settings of low intensity conflict and when tailored carefully to local conditions. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This special issue aims to better understand mediated communication about conflict, and in 
particular, the ways in which different types of media matter to the emergence, escalation or 
conversely, the pacification and prevention of violence across different contexts and cases. We 
understand conflict in a broad sense as a ’severe disagreement between at least two sides, where 
their demands cannot be met by the same resources at the same time’ (Wallensteen 2007: 14). 
Resources are here not just measurable tangible realities such as money, territory or access to other 
forms of power, but can also involve socially constructed intangibles such as collective values, norms 
or psychological needs of actors for recognition or apology from other actors (ibid). Conflict does not 
necessarily need violent action to be observable, but can be latent with no or little attempts to 
                                                          
1 The work for this special issue was funded by the EU’s FP7 programme under the Grant Agreement No 613308 for 
the INFOCORE project (www.infocore.eu). The guest editors would like to thank all members of the project for their 
contribution to the special issue as well as comments on the introduction, particularly Romy Fröhlich, Thomas 
Hanitzsch, Abit Hoxha, Eric Sangar and Eva Michaels. 
resolve the underlying issue, whereas a manifest conflict involves a broad spectrum of actions 
ranging from demonstrations, over riots to full-blown war at the extreme end. 
The need for a comprehensive and up-to-date investigation arises from interlocking changes in the 
nature of conflict as well as in the means, structures and participants involved in the communication 
about it over the last decade. In particular, scholars highlighted an ‘uneven, yet clearly visible, 
upward trend’ in the number and lethality of armed conflicts, particularly those described as 
internationalised with other states contributing troops to one or both warring sides as in Ukraine 
(Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). Syria has turned into the prototype of a multi-layered and 
complex conflict involving not just diverse conflict parties from within the country such as Hezbollah, 
Al-Nusra or Da’esh, but also a strong regional dimension with the rivalry between Saudi-Arabia and 
Iran, coupled with the involvement of states from outside the region, most notably the US, France 
and Russia. These changes have been partly caused and partly affected by significant changes in how 
communication about conflict takes place, who shapes it and with what effect: winning the battle for 
international, regional and domestic public opinion is increasingly seen as essential by non-Western 
states who have invested in creating or expanding media outlets sympathetic to their views, whilst 
many news organisations based in Western capitals have been cutting back as advertising revenues 
declined. We have witnessed the rise of social media such as Facebook and Twitter with the effect of 
not only increasing the speed and accessibility of conflict news, but also diversifying the range of 
actors who shape them and the level they are located at. Conflict news are no longer produced 
exclusively by trained journalists, but involve to a growing extent active and innovating citizens, 
bloggers, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and diaspora communities. These new media 
types challenge not just the gate-keeping function and credibility of the traditional media, but also 
governmental and military control over the flow of information, leading to adaptations in military 
tactics and new forms of intelligence gathering and surveillance. They also impact how international 
media assistance is perceived and implemented worldwide.  
As the media landscape becomes more heterogeneous, it becomes arguably more difficult to 
identify stable overarching patterns affecting conflict communication and to theorise the different 
roles that particular actors and media may play in conflict communication in specific cases. The 
papers in this special issue present the first findings of the INFOCORE research project, which 
combines a comparative design involving six conflict cases (two in the Balkans – Macedonia and 
Kosovo -, two in the Middle-East – Syrian and Israel/Palestine – and two in Africa – Burundi and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo) over a period of up to 10 years. The theoretical point of departure 
for the project is the expectation that media content – which contains evidential claims, frames, and 
agendas for action – influences conflict actors’ cognition, attitudes, and behaviour and thus 
ultimately conflict dynamics.  The research team used a multi-method approach involving 
automated and qualitative content analysis of a wide variety of media sources with evidence from 
practitioner interviews, focus-groups and surveys. This allows us to glimpse the complexity of 
conflict communication and identify any common patterns whilst being sensitive to the many ways 
in which each conflict case offers a unique combination of conditioning factors.  
This first section of this introduction explains the research design, core concepts and methodological 
approach underpinning the research on which the papers draw. In a second step, we will present 
four findings emerging from the contributions to the special issue and the broader research project 
about (i) patterns of media coverage of conflict; (ii) who is shaping it, (iii) explanations for 
differences in media influence; and finally, (iv) normative perspectives on media influence. In the 
conclusion we discuss what our findings mean for attempts to understand media roles in violent 
conflict. We make the case for combining an interactionist approach of media influence, which is 
centred on distinct episodes and effects that develop over time, with greater sensitivity for the 
factors that make conflict cases so different. We argue that the best intervention strategies will be 
carefully tailored to the conditions of each country and conflict, sustained over a longer term and 
start before conflicts have already escalated. 
 
2. Theory, Design and Methods 
 
INFOCORE’s approach to the study of the role of the media in violent conflict aims to capture the 
ways in which communication about conflict is generated as well as the effects media content has 
on conflict actors and dynamics. Insofar as conflict news is produced by journalists working for 
different kinds of media, the answer to the first question can draw on insights from communication, 
journalism and communication media studies, for instance research related to news values, routines 
and editorial cultures. In contrast, an answer to the second question requires an engagement with 
international relations and political science, most notably peace and conflict studies as well as 
foreign policy analysis.  
As we argued elsewhere in more detail, theorising the role of the media in conflict has been 
hampered by at least three forms of fragmentation of the state of the art (Baden and Meyer 2016). 
The first dimension can be found in how possible media roles are discussed across and sometimes 
even within disciplinary fields such as sociology (on radicalisation and the notion of risk in counter-
terrorism and “Western ways of war”), critical and feminist scholarship (e.g. denouncing hegemonic 
discourse power, examining practices of masculinity or victimisation), psychology and genocide 
studies (the emergence and impact of hate speech), journalism studies (peace or conflict-sensitive 
journalism), political communication (e.g. CNN effect, Politics-Media relations), in International 
Relations and Security Studies (media roles in foreign policy and intelligence), and indeed in peace 
studies (especially media assistance for conflict prevention, media role in peace building processes). 
However, there has been limited cross-fertilisation between research fields and few attempts to 
integrate knowledge and identify connectable or generalisable insights about the multiple and 
contingent role of media in conflict (Livingston 1997). Given the predominance of pessimistic 
accounts of media contributing to mobilisation for war (Carruthers 2011), hindering conflict 
prevention (Gowing 1997; Jakobsen 2000) and making peace processes more difficult (Wolfsfeld 
2004), it would be all the more important to understand under what conditions media can also 
support peace and reconciliation as case study evidence suggests (Hoffmann and Hawkins 2015; 
Frère 2007). 
The second source of fragmentation relates to the different explanatory approaches to specific 
observed media influences. Influence can be conceived in radically different ways depending on 
whether one operates within a liberal contestation, a cultural or manufacturing consent paradigm 
(Cottle, 2006: 13-32). Even within first model one can distinguish between studies envisaging 
primarily cognitive effects from others concerned primarily with attitudinal or even behavioural 
effects of the media on conflict actors. At the same time, perceptions, attitudes and behavioural 
options of media audiences in conflict are at best scantly conceptualised, in contrasting ways. Most 
studies addressing media influences on conflict policies and decision-making, as well as some 
investigations of new media uses inside conflict areas assume reasonably rational actors with set 
interests and capabilities who seek information to generate and chose options for action. By 
contrast, research into media influences on the general public tends to assume a badly informed, 
emotion-driven audience, either torn between competing policy options or easily mobilised for 
individual or collective violent action. These reflect also differences as to whether influence is 
investigated at the level of individuals or at the aggregate level of institutions, social groups, or even 
societies. The expected reliance of the general public on the media ranges between the media as 
main, complementary, or auxiliary source of information and interpretation and media capable of 
influencing audiences with single reports or images, or only with consonant, salient coverage. Each 
combination of underlying mechanisms gives rise to quite different possible media roles and 
conditions for their occurrence, again necessitating a more systematic appraisal and integration. 
Third, fragmentation is even more evident among the empirical studies conducted in each field. 
Proceeding in a highly case-bound fashion, most accounts of media influences are based on thick 
descriptions and argumentation, highlighting selected routes of media influence. Comparative 
assessments or other strategies able to control the complex confounding explanations for observed 
phenomena in each case have been rare, as have been efforts at testing hypotheses or identifying 
the specific conditions and factors enabling or obstructing specific influences (Neuman 1996; 
Fröhlich, Scherer, and Scheufele 2007; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Hanitzsch, and Nagar 2016). 
Moreover, most studies focus on single types of media, addressing influences of highbrow 
journalism, global social media, or specific regional radio stations. Differences between local media 
(operating in conflict zone and addressing primarily a local audience) and transnational media 
(operating from abroad and targeting local or foreign audiences) are very seldom taken into account, 
and comparative studies are lacking in that field. A discussion of the changing roles of media due to 
changes in global as well as regional communication flows and technologies is largely absent. 
Moreover, many of the case studies chosen involve some degree of interest from or even direct 
participation by the United States and Britain, giving many debates about media roles in foreign 
policy an Anglo-American flavour and raising questions about generalisability.  
Given the limited use of both theory and comparative data, most causal claims and proposed 
mechanisms are both underspecified and in need of systematic corroboration. While the wealth of 
case-specific, rich studies should in principle enable some classification and identification of 
recurrent patterns, which may reveal important conditions for different media influences to 
manifest themselves, to our knowledge no such effort has been undertaken to date. Therefore, we 
cannot draw upon a single theory covering these dynamics that is reliable, comprehensive and 
persuasive enough to be operationalised within a narrow “theory-testing” design. Our approach is 
therefore sensitive to the different yet possibly complementary role media play in conflict situations 
and the competing explanatory approaches used in different fields. According to Cottle’s (2006) 
conceptualization of theoretical approaches, INFOCORE’s perspective can be broadly situated within 
a liberal interactionist paradigm, as opposed to culturalist or marxist perspectives. It aims to 
accommodate the variability of both channels and conflict contexts of possible media influences, 
specifying mechanisms that may operate in different ways depending on the investigated case, 
outlets and changes over time. Our investigation revolves around three discursive categories of 
media content, the ways in which these are shaped by different actors, and the effects they have on 
conflict dynamics. Specifically, we are interested in the interplay between the cognition, attitudes 
and behavior of conflict actors and the evidential claims, interpretative frames, and agendas for 
action. These are constructed by strategic actors, and transformed in the process of including them 
within media content, applying journalistic interventions (Tenenboim-Weinblatt & Baden, 2016) and 
adapting them to the needs of different media genres and channels (Figure 1). The actual impact of 
these forms media content in a concrete conflict case will depend on three amplification variables 
(Baden and Meyer 2016):  reach refers to the expectation that media content will be more 
influential if it is received by a larger audience over a prolonged period of time; visibility is measure 
of how much attention or prominence media give to media content within their overall coverage; 
consonance, finally, denotes the expectation that influence of media content rises the more it is 
being repeated by different sources over a prolonged period of time.  
 
Evidential claims aim primarily to create or modify cognitive beliefs about a given referent object, 
problem or dynamic in the social or natural world as well as conveying the limitations to what is 
known or knowable (Meyer 2016; Meyer and Sangar 2014; Baden and Stalpouskaya 2015). Such 
claims can relate to the details of important events (who committed a chemical weapons attack?), 
actors (what are the intentions of leaders?) as well as dynamics (what is the main cause or driver of 
a conflict?). They can be made with varying degrees of certainty or confidence and can be 
distinguished as to whether they are rooted in some form of direct observation or whether they 
require analytical judgement about cause and effect in relationships. They are the backbone and 
main subject of news coverage as well as intelligence reports, although they may greatly differ in 
their specificity and nuance. They matter most to shaping the cognition of policy-communities who 
are trained to pay attention to detail and employ professional standards for judging the quality of 
information. However, evidential claims can also sustain or contradict widely held or mediated 
frames as substantially more abstract and simplified ways of making sense of reality insofar as they 
may legitimise or de-legitimate preferred interpretations about key actors’ intentions and overall 
conflict dynamics, for instance whether protests are secular or sectarian in nature.  
Frames function by suggesting specific interpretations and appraisals of conflict events (Entman 
1993; Goffman 1974). Embedding evidential claims within a selective context of related beliefs, 
frames imply a central organising idea that renders conflict events understandable and endows them 
with specific meaning. Based on the presented interpretation, they suggest specific evaluative 
standards suitable for appraising framed information, enabling the formation of both ad-hoc 
emotive responses and longer-lasting evaluative attitudes. Frames exist on different levels of 
abstraction and range from relatively transient contextualisations of specific events to long-lasting 
“master frames” that organise complex issues and subsume numerous specific frames (Baden & 
Springer, 2015). They have been amply documented to affect recipients’ attitudes toward a wide 
range of issues, including violent conflict. For instance, framing conflict as grievances imposed by 
external actors tends to build positive attitudes toward a decisive, collective response, while 
highlighting the interplay of all sides in a conflict may foster conciliatory attitudes. Likewise, raising 
evaluative standards of human suffering among the in-group reduces cooperative attitudes (Butler 
2010), while paradoxically, depictions of vulnerable, victimised women often serve to reinforce 
readiness to engage in violent behavior against masculinised outgroups. The specific power of media 
frames is evident primarily where they serve to synchronise the interpretations and attitudes of 
larger actor groups. By proposing widely acceptable situation definitions and promoting a shared 
sense of grievance, moral outrage, and a need for action, frames can forcefully mobilise public 
consensus (Klandermans 1988). 
Thirdly, distinctive agendas for action in a given conflict can be implied by the interpretations 
advanced by present frames as in the case of prognostic frames (Snow and Benford 1988) and 
frames’ treatment recommendation function (Entman 1993). However, as different frames may 
support the same course of action, it makes sense to think of agendas for action as separate media 
contents, which may appear with or without the support of a specific frame. Agendas for action 
explicate what, if anything, should be done about a situation. They can range from highly specific, 
sometimes elaborate plans involving multiple sequential or contingent steps, to vaguely specified 
calls for action, to simple requests that somebody should do “something”, or not pursue a specific 
course of action. Agendas for action both direct and motivate specific kinds of behavior, and thus 
have the potential to directly impact the development of violent conflict. For instance, successful 
radicalisation often involves incitement that motivates specific perpetrators to commit violent acts 
against specific target groups. Agendas for action suitable to affect conflict developments include 
calls for violence, but also political protest, boycott, denouncing possible accomplices of the 'enemy', 
raising donations, spreading propaganda or lower key activities such as voting in support of 
particular policies. Agendas for action may call for both realistic and unrealistic conflict actions, and 
may take different forms depending on whether they address decision-making elites (calling for 
specific conflict policies) or lay publics to whom such courses of action are unavailable. To the extent 
that agendas for action are powerful enough to inform dispersed audiences of how a resolution of a 
perceived grievance can be achieved, they have the potential to powerfully shape collective action, if 
not collective violence in conflict. 
 
  
  
Figure 1: Interrelationship between actors and discursive categories in conflict communication 
 
While ‘frames’ have been used as a self-standing concept in research for decades, we argue that 
media roles can only be adequately understood by looking at the varied and aggregate effects 
arising from all three concepts and grasping their interdependencies. Frames include and 
presuppose specific evidential claims that must be accepted for the frame to become effective (e.g. 
blaming escalation on specific groups may depend on the belief that this group’s actions are 
responsible for specific events, were unprovoked, and so on). In turn, agendas for action are 
supported and justified by particular frames that must be accepted for the agenda to appear 
plausible (for instance, calls for a pogrom presuppose that the targeted ethnic or religious group is 
interpreted as a mortal enemy or ‘parasite’ and accordingly resented). This does not imply a linear or 
strictly hierarchical relationship as there is substantial evidence that agendas for action, say for 
instance calls to topple Saddam Hussein in 2003, can generate intelligence and news media coverage 
that is supportive of this aim. A major analytical question is thus who has the power to shape claims, 
frames and agendas for action in mediated communication, whereas a normative question is 
whether novel evidential claims arise from the professionally competent observation of new 
developments on the ground, or whether such claims themselves selectively picked, ignored, or 
even created by powerful political or commercial interests to serve pre-existing narratives or 
preferred courses of action. 
 
Case Study Selection 
We follow Weissmann & Swanstrom (2005: 11) in distinguishing between stable peace, fragile 
peace, open conflict, crisis and war situations.  Insofar as all conflicts are socially constructed, the 
transition from one conflict stage to another can be conceived as heightening or lessening of 
tensions through the verbal or non-verbal actions of conflict parties or citizens loosely associated 
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with them. The nature of such actions can be expected to vary substantially as responses fall into 
various policy paradigms such as longer or shorter term prevention, crisis management, peace-
making and peace-keeping, conflict resolution, and peace-building and reconciliation. To capture 
and systemically compare patterns and dynamics in the production of conflict news and their 
reception over time we need some variation in the context conditions as well as in the outcomes. 
Therefore, we have selected six cases spanning a spectrum of fragile peace with some evidence of 
conflict transformation during our period of observation such as Kosovo (with a steady 
improvement), or the case of Burundi which changed from fragile peace to crisis and the extreme 
case of Syria which quickly escalated from fragile peace to war involving both domestic as well as 
international actors within a short space of time. Whilst conflict intensity was the main selection 
criterion, these cases taken from three different regions offer significant variation in other 
potentially important background variables such as key characteristics of the media system, state of 
democracy, and the degree of international attention to and involvement in the conflict. For 
instance, Israel/Palestine is a case with a high degree of foreign news attention whereas Macedonia 
gets little publicity. In Burundi, less than 5 percent of the population are internet users, whereas an 
estimated 29 percent of Syria’s and 72 percent of Israel’s population have an internet connection 
(Internet Live Stats 2016). Similarly, the media in Israel have a high degree of autonomy whereas in 
Macedonia and Syria most media outlets are closely tied to conflict parties, albeit for different 
reasons and through different mechanisms. Moreover, in Burundi and the DRC several major local 
media outlets are fully funded by foreign media assistance programmes, which has an impact on 
their editorial lines. The relative significance of these variables, however, becomes only apparent 
through the research process itself and its openness to the discovery of novel connections within 
and between cases. More detailed descriptions of these cases be found in the articles.  
Table 1: Overview of Key Case Properties 
Case  Time period Conflict 
Stage 
Conflict 
Trajectory 
Media 
Freedom 
Involvement of 
International 
Actors 
Kosovo 01/01/2010-
30/06/2015 
Fragile Peace Slight 
improvement 
Medium 
 
(2010: 92/178- 
2015:  87/179) 
Medium to high 
Macedonia 01/01/2011-
30/06/2015 
Fragile peace 
on verge to 
open conflict 
Deterioration Medium 
 
(2011: 68/172 
2015: 
118/179) 
Low to medium 
DRC 01/01/2011-
30/06/2015 
Open conflict Conflict relapse 
in Eastern DRC 
(4/2012-
11/2013) 
Low 
 
2010: 148/178 
2015: 150/179 
Medium to high 
Burundi 01/01/2010-
30/06/2015 
Crisis Deterioration 
(especially from 
April 2015 on) 
Medium to 
Low 
 
2010: 108/178 
2015: 145/179 
Medium 
Israel/Pales
tine 
01/01/2006-
30/06/2015 
 
Open conflict 
– crisis 
Fluctuating High to 
medium 
 
2006: 50/160 
2015: 101/179 
High 
Syria 01/01/2010-
30/06/2015 
Dictatorship 
before 2011- 
war 
Rapid 
deterioration 
Very low 
 
2010: 173/178 
2015: 177/179 
Very high 
Source: authors, using Reporter without borders index for media freedom (https://rsf.org/ranking) 
We have collected and analysed a huge amount of media texts (Baden and Tenenboim-Weinblatt 
2017), including Twitter feeds and Facebook posts (Dimitrakopoulou and Boukala 2017), but also 
upstream and downstream texts such as NGOs PR, press releases and reports (Fröhlich and Jungblut 
2017) as well as parliamentary debates (Berganza et al. 2017). Moreover, we have conducted 
interviews with NGO staff, political leaders and journalists to analyse how news are actually 
produced rather than actors’ own theories about them (Hoxha and Hanitzsch 2017), how NGOs 
differ in their communication strategies and influence (Meyer et al.in this issue) and how political 
leaders perceive the impact of legacy and social media on their ability to control events and make 
peace (Wolfsfeld 2017). Apart from the focus-groups and survey that aim to explore how the 
audiences in conflict countries interact with news (Trpevska et al. 2016), we have conducted more 
than 400 individual interviews which helped us to build up a nuanced picture of the dynamics 
between the most significant actors in each of these conflict settings, but also to detect overarching 
patterns and key conditioning factors behind media coverage. In the following, we want to draw to 
present four findings that have emergence from the contributions to this special issue as well as the 
broader research project about the causes and effects of conflict communication and coverage.  
 
3.1 Identifying patterns of conflict coverage 
The contribution by Baden and Tenenboim-Weinblatt (2017) provides us with nuanced data from 
these different conflicts to confirm that ‘ [m]uch media attention is narrowly focused around salient 
events, oriented toward reporting violence rather than peace-related news, and wanes as violence 
drags on’. Indeed, they find that media coverage is not strongly related to actual changes in the level 
of violence except for the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and while media do pay more attention to 
periods of initial escalation or large scale violent events as in the case of Syria, they find only ‘weak 
evidence of escalation induced changes, particularly in domestic news coverage’. They find highly 
significant differences though between foreign news coverage and the much less-well researched 
domestic news coverage with the latter being less short-lived than the former and starting to cover 
escalating tensions earlier. This may not be entirely surprising, but has important implications for 
those who rely on media as early warning systems of conflict (Chadefaux 2014). They conclude that 
attention does not wane as quickly as some of the more pessimistic critics of media coverage argue. 
A potentially more positive finding is that even though the data confirm the preference for violence-
related as opposed to peace-related news, there is not as much change in situations of escalation as 
one might have expected and the same goes with the frequently hypothesised lack of critical 
distance. They find therefore less support for the thesis of ‘news media abandoning professional 
standards and rallying around the flag’ during periods of escalation as the literature might lead us to 
expect. Finally, the findings from the quantitative media content analysis point to the importance of 
paying more attention to how particular features of each of our six cases account for significant 
differences in the patterns of media coverage. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict sticks out as unusual in 
the degree to which foreign media attention and political attention are closely correlated and react 
highly sensitively to any incident of violence, whereas other conflicts geographically and politically 
closer to Western realpolitik interest attract much less foreign media attention such as Macedonia 
and Kosovo. 
While the nature of the data-set and indicators used imposes limitations to the depth of the analysis, 
the qualitative findings from the interviews do point to important variations between cases in the 
characteristics of media coverage, especially the degree to which the media are contributing to 
polarisation in situations where there is considerable potential for identity-based conflict. In the 
cases of Kosovo and, to a lesser degree, Burundi, interviewees highlighted a general sense of caution 
and reluctance in terms of portraying incidents of violence along ethnic lines. The same applies to 
Burundi, a country which has been considered as a “laboratory” for media and peace-building 
initiatives during a decade. In some cases this caution may only apply to one part of the media 
system. For instance, we have qualitative evidence of the Albanian language media in Macedonia 
playing a calming role during episodes such as the Kumanovo incident (Trpevska et al. 2017), 
whereas our research shows less restraint and greater openness to playing up inter-ethnic 
differences in the Macedonian media. Similarly, in the case of Syria in the early months of the 
uprising, the state-controlled media were ready to support the government’s message of branding 
the initial uprising as sectarian and ethnic in nature, whereas the gradually evolving but much less 
powerful “revolutionary” media emphasised the non-sectarian nature of their grievances against the 
Assad regime. Qualitative evidence from the interviews and the surveys gathered by Trpevska et al. 
(2017) also point to the influential role of media transmitting from across the border or indeed the 
regional TV networks such as Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera, each with a distinctive take on a given 
conflict situation given their audiences and funders. 
 
3.2 Who shapes media content? 
We know that news does not “naturally” emerge from events in the real-word, but is in various ways 
constructed according to professional routines and norms held by journalists as well as a number of 
factors external to journalists (Shoemaker and Reese 2013). Hoxha and Hanitzsch (2017) show 
through the novel method of story reconstruction how conflict news comes into being. Their 
research into article biographies shows that contrary to journalists’ self-legitimising professional 
narrative of “authoritative storytellers” producing “original” news emerging from open-minded 
research in the real world, journalists actually produce news in at least partially contradictory ways. 
They typically conduct their research according to pre-existing narratives about what the conflict is 
about and are influenced in this by their main sources as well as what is possible to research in 
practical terms. Here potentially significant differences emerge between journalists as typically 
younger freelance journalists relying more on social media for the story ideation and European 
capital-based journalists on news agencies, whereas more experienced correspondents rely on their 
professional networks they have grown over many years. The authors highlight the risk of conflict 
coverage becoming ‘self-referential’ and missing out on complexities and inconvenient truths about 
conflict parties as journalists tend to follow a small number of leading news outlets and the 
homogenising perspective arising from social media. They also note the importance of physical 
access (as in Syria) and diplomatic secrecy (as in negotiation between EU and Kosovarian authorities) 
for explaining why certain facts cannot be gathered and related stories never be written. As a result, 
conflict news becomes more vulnerable to various forms of source manipulation as well as one-
dimensional conflict narratives, especially under conditions of increasing prevarication in journalistic 
careers and increasing pressures from owners and political actors in many conflict settings. 
The paper by Meyer, Sangar and Strickmann (2017) complements these findings by theorising the 
growing influence NGOs have had on media coverage in France and the UK in the case of Syria. They 
develop a “supply-and-demand model” of NGO contents in mediated coverage of conflict to clarify 
some of the reasons why and when NGO influence has grown. These include the growing difficulty of 
media access to particularly dangerous conflict areas or the rising costs of safety and insurances for 
journalists. On the other hand, they note the growing professionalisation and reputation 
management of large international NGOs, but also find surprising evidence of how relatively small 
and little known semi-local NGOs can become frequently cited sources of media coverage. The 
Syrian Observatory of Human Rights and Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently demonstrate how 
strong local networks of informers, empowered by new communication technology and social 
media, can give poorly resourced NGOs a competitive edge and credibility as providers of raw 
material for news – even though some of these organisations are associated with one conflict party. 
The other finding is that the strong reliance on Human Rights-focused NGOs for conflict coverage, 
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, creates a systematic bias for a moral 
framing not just of the event coverage, but also the analytical judgements, to some extent, 
prescriptions for Western policy-makers on how to act. In contrast, NGOs such as the International 
Crisis Group who tend to complexify a conflict and attempt to understand the motives of all conflict 
parties, including those who have committed most human rights violations, are less influential. 
The rise of social media and new communication technology has not just helped to amplify the voice 
of less well-resourced local and semi-local NGOs as well as exiled journalists forced to emigrate 
because of conflict (Frère 2017), but also empowered ordinary citizens in complex ways as Trpevska 
et al. and Wolfsfeld show (Trpevska et al. 2017; Wolfsfeld 2017). The former demonstrate that 
between 5-15 percent of surveyed citizens use the growing range of interaction opportunities 
offered by media organisations, such as phoning into radio shows, participating through comments 
on online forums and news websites. Active citizens are of course also the main contributors to 
social media such as Facebook, which have in some conflict settings become the major source of 
news, or have challenged official accounts on Twitter as the case of Burundi shows (Dimitrakopoulou 
and Boukala 2017). Wolfsfeld’s interviews with Palestinian and Israeli political leaders confirm that 
political authorities perceive some loss of control over the flow of information shaping conflict news. 
Under conditions of high international attention and scrutiny of actions of the Israeli security 
services, the recording and online transmission of events by citizens using increasingly ubiquitous 
mobile phones has developed into a major source of conflict news. He notes that this new 
technology may be a means for structurally weaker conflict parties to bring domestic as well as 
international media attention to disproportionate use of force and outright human rights violations. 
Particularly for the audiovisual media such material becomes highly valuable in cases of severe 
access restrictions and we have qualitative evidence of larger media organisations investing in their 
capacities to cross-check and if possible verify the authenticity of such uploads or live-streamings 
(Meyer and Michaels 2016: 8). In contrast, there is also evidence that less-resourced organisations 
are so vulnerable to the imperative of ”being first” and “maximising clicks” associated with 
advertising revenue that they increasingly pass on news without confirming their accuracy as well as 
becoming inadvertent accomplices in the propagandistic events of terrorist groups such as Islamic 
State/Daesh. 
 
3.3 How can we account for variations in media influence? 
One of the strongest insights emerging from our comparative research is the highly contingent and 
variable nature of media influence. Trpevska et al. (2017) have conducted a number of focused 
group interviews and surveys with lay-members of the audience in Macedonia, Burundi and Syria to 
determine their media use, their reception of, trust in and engagement with the media and their 
conflict coverage. This research underlines the considerable importance of domestic media, 
particularly TV in the Balkans and the Middle-East, and radio in Africa, as the main source of news 
but also shows considerable variation in how citizens use and perceive different types of media 
based on three factors: ‘the development of the media systems and the availability of diverse 
information sources; the extent to which the media are free from political and military influences 
and manipulation; and the specific phase of the conflict cycle or the extent to which the media 
system is disrupted by the violence on the field’. Some media are limited by the geographic reach of 
the transmission (radio or newspapers in Burundi), some are not consumed because a significant 
proportion of the population does not understand the language of transmission (Albanian media in 
Macedonia) and some media are not accessible due to the intensity of fighting and the breakdown 
of communication infrastructure (in parts of Syria). Moreover, they highlight that trust in different 
media is generally low, but even here highly variable given the extent to which conflict parties 
control parts of the media (Macedonia) or journalists are being seen as corrupt (DRC). In cases of 
great deficiencies in local media, citizens in countries such as Burundi rely to substantial degree on 
word-of-mouth, on foreign broadcasters, or on social media as in Syria or Macedonia. Regional, 
neighbouring or international channels also play a significant role as sources of conflict news, 
particularly in the Syrian, and to some degree the Macedonian case. An additional factor may be the 
degree of internationalisation of a given conflict, which makes domestic media as well as political 
actors more sensitive to criticism in foreign news media and empowers domestic media to raise 
those issues that are salient for international actors. 
Looking at the impact of media on foreign policy in four Western countries, the study of Berganza et 
al. (2017) shows to what extent which media, social media and NGOs are being used in 
parliamentary debates in Paris, London, Berlin and Brussels. They do not find any significant increase 
or decrease over time, but references to these actors fluctuate according to the occurrence of 
focusing events as well as distinct phases within a conflict. A remarkable finding is that social media 
are almost as much referenced as traditional media in these debates, although they note significant 
if moderate differences between different parliaments, possibly reflecting differences in the 
prevalence of social media in national political cultures. In Germany, traditional media and NGOs are 
referred to substantially more than in the British Parliament where social media are used frequently. 
Differences between the conflicts are moderate except for the use of social media in the case of 
Syria which could be easily explained by a combination of journalistic access difficulties and the 
impact of the social media campaigns by ISIS/Daesh. There is some preliminary evidence to suggest 
that parliamentary debates pick up more positive references to media given their problem-solving 
orientation in foreign policy. 
 
4.4 Normative approaches to media content and influence 
The contributors to the special issue do not subscribe to a single normative benchmark for 
investigating what ‘good’ or ‘bad’ communication is. Some of the contributors have been critical 
about the concept of peace journalism in particular to serve as a suitable normative yardstick to 
judge journalistic practices (Hanitzsch 2007; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Hanitzsch, and Nagar 2016), 
whereas others have shown how multi-ethnic newsrooms and “peace-sensitive” media outlets 
supported by foreign NGOs could have a positive impact (Frère & Fiedler 2016). If anything, this 
project’s first findings show how problematic it would be to narrowly focus on journalist 
performance when key determinants of coverage are situated at the level of well-resourced and 
strategic sources, media owners, or political actors at domestic or international levels. In two of our 
country cases (Kosovo and Burundi) we have found some evidence that many media outlets exercise 
a considerable degree of caution and sensitivity in using ethnicity in their coverage of conflict events 
or dynamics. While this may partly reflect lessons learnt from previous escalations of violence by 
political actors, it does simultaneously point to the positive effects the international community has 
had by engaging for the long-term, before the outbreak of major hostilities, and providing sufficient 
financial support for journalist training and media organisations. In other cases such as Macedonia 
there was less forceful, tailored and sustained engagement by the international community and 
insufficient external pressure was exerted to overcome the ethnic polarisation and political 
instrumentalisation shaping the media system. 
Our research also indicates that conflict communication has spread substantially beyond what 
professionally trained and permanently employed journalists do, to include part-time journalists 
working for multiple media as well as non-media organisations, political activists and ordinary 
citizens as they act as communicators in places like Syria and Macedonia. This includes local and 
international NGOs becoming more media-like in their communication strategies and practices. The 
digital transformation of the existing media landscape as well as the rise of social media is 
transforming political communication about conflict, albeit with variable consequences between 
cases and within conflict stages. This has implications not just for the risks individual actors face, but 
also for questions of trust in the media and journalism more broadly that require further 
exploration. 
Some of our contributors engage directly with normative questions and in particular whether media 
coverage has conflict dampening or heightening effects. Normative dilemmas are often unavoidable 
for instance when considering the positive role the media can play in democratic transitions, which 
simultaneously increase risks of instability and mass atrocities. The rise of social media in particular 
is normatively ambivalent as it facilitates the expression of repressed voices within civil society and 
holding security services to account for violations of their human rights. At the same time, as 
Wolfsfeld argues, political leaders from both sides of the conflict tend to see social media as 
inherently unhelpful to efforts of building peace (Wolfsfeld 2017). They can breed self-referentialism 
among journalists, underpin a political economy of attention for the most emotive and often violent 
content, and can be used by conflict parties for spreading fear and as tools for surveillance and 
identification of political challengers. The paper by Dimitrakopoulou and Boukala (2017) 
demonstrates this normative ambivalence by looking at the tweets of the Burundian President office 
and his spokesperson. Expressed in English and therefore mainly aimed at international and elite 
audiences, it could be squarely described as propagandistic in its efforts to portray a deeply flawed 
election based on illegitimate constitutional change as a normal and transparent democratic 
practice. At the same time, it demonstrates how this official hegemonic discourse can be challenged 
by opposition “followers” and how the mask and pretence of such communication slips as the 
spokesperson resorts to dehumanising language and threats against those who want to protest 
against the president.  
Even if prescriptions about how precisely to cover a conflict, how much room one should give to 
other conflict parties and what constitutes conflict-sensitive, inflammatory or dangerous coverage 
will remain contentious, it is easier to find agreement about the basic needs for audiences to be 
supplied with accurate and trustworthy information. Fröhlich and Jungblut (2017) argue that not 
only media content but also (strategic and persuasive) communication of NGOs needs to fulfil 
normative expectations. Their evidential claims are expected to be supported by evidence, to be 
transparent about the sources of evidence whenever possible to allow verification, and to express 
whether such claims are highly certain or need to be approached with caution for a number of 
reasons. While they find a significant proportion of NGOs statements contains such epistemological 
qualifiers, they do see substantial potential for improvement in terms of providing sources of 
evidence and not overselling their claims in terms of certainty.  
 
Conclusion 
With the first findings of the collaborative research project available, we have gained a more 
nuanced understanding of how different media discuss matters of peace and violence and how 
audiences at different levels perceive, react and engage. On a conceptual-theoretical level, we argue 
that our approach centred on the effects of evidential claims, frames and agendas for action offers a 
more nuanced basis for analysing the dynamics of conflict communication and their impacts on 
conflict escalation and pacification than existing approaches. The specific role played by the media 
depends, chiefly, a) on the ways in which it transforms conflict actors’ claims, interpretations and 
prescriptions into contents that fit specific media, and b) their ability to amplify these contents and 
endow them with reach, visibility and consonance. We found significant variation in media roles 
across the six cases and suggest that they are best explained by taking into account four closely 
interlocking conditioning factors: (i) the degree to which the media landscape is diverse and free, or 
conversely, controlled and instrumentalised by conflict parties; (ii) societal attitudes to and uses of 
different media by audiences; (iii) different degrees of conflict intensity and dynamics between the 
conflict parties; (iv) the degree and nature of the involvement of regional and international actors. 
We found that media landscapes vary significantly in the opportunities they offer to both political 
actors as well as media organisations to inform and influence audiences. Domestic and indeed local 
conditions for media communication in our conflict cases often differ in important respects from the 
extensively researched dynamics of foreign news in Western countries, particularly the United 
States. Conflict communication cannot be disconnected from the issues and political interests 
underlying the conflict and the actors shaping it. Conflict parties attempt to use the media to turn-up 
or down the temperature of media coverage and compete over key claims, frames and agendas for 
action. In most of our cases, state authorities manage to exercise significant influence both in social 
as well as conventional media environments through their disproportionate resources and 
communication power, as well as their control of widely consumed domestic television channels. By 
focusing on the interests behind this competition and their degree of media control, we gain a better 
understanding of how conflict discourse evolves and what the results of such competitive claims-
making in different arenas of public communication might be.  
However, we also saw how journalists and other communicators attempt to escape such control and 
how audiences are highly active and selective in whom they listen to and trust. Media consumption 
patterns point to domestic publics in conflict regions being, in some places, more 
compartmentalised, locally focused as well as polarised, with a tendency to confirm rather than 
challenge existing beliefs, attitudes and patterns of behaviour. But in the African cases, for instance, 
audiences appear to be composed of “poly-consumers” who turn to a wide diversity of media (even 
the ones they do not trust) in order to get a full picture and then “balance” the different versions by 
themselves. In the case of Syria, we see the influence of international and regional broadcasters as 
well as media operating from across the border. Social media are increasingly used to express 
dissent, mobilise protest, offer practical help to citizens faced with the consequences of conflict, and 
gain alternative views in highly polarised settings.  Yet even as citizens and political activists adapt 
and innovate to overcome numerous restrictions on communication, they often struggle to push 
through against traditional conflict actors and achieve the same kind of reach.  
We also see that media roles vary over time and in relation to specific conflict episodes, phases and 
dynamics. This means that during high intensity conflict the domestic media infrastructure can 
weaken or break down in parts of the country whilst foreign journalists struggle to get access to the 
country or regions within it as they deem the risk of being kidnapped, tortured or killed too high, or 
find their reporting compromised by having to become ‘embedded’ with whatever political authority 
controls a territory at the time. Their place is often filled by domestic activists and ordinary citizens 
who get involved in political communication, often at considerable risk to their own safety. In a more 
immediate sense, paying attention to conflict dynamics is important because the ability of conflict 
parties to effectively control territory and the actors within it is closely linked with their capacity to 
shape conflict communication emanating from and to this territory. 
In addition to these domestic factors, we see that the involvement of regional and international 
powers matters both to the conflict itself as well as the shape of political communication about it. 
An extraordinarily high degree of international attention to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict helps to 
explain why this case is so different from the others in the patterns of media coverage. It also 
influences why Israeli defence forces are so worried about the loss of control over information 
through mobile phones and social media. In Kosovo and Burundi foreign engagement has helped to 
promote higher sensitivity of some media to the risk of heightening inter-ethnic tensions through 
the way they portray and comment on events. In the DR Congo, a radio station established and 
financially supported by the UN remains the only inclusive public service broadcaster with national 
coverage and played a part in restoring the social fabric. While we cannot be optimistic about short-
term efforts of influencing media coverage on conflict, it appears that media assistance programmes 
can have a positive impact if they are carefully tailored to the conditions of each country and 
conflict, embedded in a broader strategy of addressing conflict courses and sustained over a longer 
term.  
Finally, our research confirmed and accentuated some worrying trends for audience trust in accurate 
and reliable journalist coverage of conflict. A growing gap has been created by the retreat of well-
resourced, professional and independent journalism, particularly at the domestic level, as there are 
less and less foreign war correspondents covering conflict zones for international media, and more 
and more local journalists taking positions as PR or communication officers in international 
organisations with better working conditions. That has created a space for other types of actors with 
primarily political and commercial or indeed value-driven objectives such as NGOs. Evidential claims, 
frames and agendas are therefore now widely circulated by media content producers other than 
professional journalists. This can lead to a narrowing of perspectives, for instance, when a moral 
framing of conflict parties leads to a distorted perception of conflict causes and flawed prescriptions 
on how to act in order to prevent further escalation. And while the increased role of social media 
might in some instances contribute to a widening of viewpoints, we found that social media tend to 
play more of an escalatory role. 
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